Churchill 1940-1945: Under Friendly Fire by Reid Walter

Author:Reid, Walter [Reid, Walter]
Language: eng
Format: mobi
ISBN: 9780857901262
Publisher: Birlinn Ltd
Published: 2011-08-01T04:00:00+00:00

28

The Alliance’s Teething Problems

From the start there was an essential difference between the allies about what Germany First really meant in terms of strategy. The Americans always thought in terms of a body blow against the Germans on mainland Europe: the Civil War way of fighting. The British were more inclined to peripheral strategy, which the Americans disparaged as ‘scatterization’.

It was a feature of the early conferences that they ended with some questions unanswered. Other questions were answered, but no one was quite sure what the answer had been. It was usually Marshall and Hopkins who were sent to work out what had been agreed. They were sent to London in April 1942 to attempt to crystallise the inconclusive discussions of ARCADIA in a form acceptable to the American military. Roosevelt was worried about an imminent Soviet collapse (a fear that continued to concern the western leaders, though Churchill was always the more sanguine), and favoured SLEDGEHAMMER, a desperate scheme for a limited Continental landing as early as the autumn of that very year, as a way of keeping Russia in the war. Marshall in fact was even more in favour of ROUNDUP, a huge single invasion in the spring of 1943, preceded by an American logistical build-up in Britain: BOLERO.

There was an important and unrecognised lack of consensus in the discussions: Ismay later recorded that ‘Our American friends went happily homewards under the mistaken impression that we had committed ourselves to both ROUNDUP and SLEDGEHAMMER’, whereas the British were in fact quite clear that SLEDGEHAMMER was out of the question. Was this just one of those misunderstandings and differences of emphasis that occur in the course of wide-ranging discussions, or was it something more sinister? The Americans certainly thought the British had deliberately broken their word,1 and some still do.2

Ismay explained pretty convincingly how the misunderstanding arose. The British Defence Committee listened to Marshall and Hopkins carefully and accepted their proposals, in principle only. The British assumed that it was understood that the proposals still had to be assessed in detail, and that their reservations about ROUNDUP and even greater doubts about SLEDGEHAMMER were equally taken for granted. But on the surface ‘in fact everyone appeared to agree with the American proposals in their entirety. No doubts were expressed; no discordant note struck. It is easy to be wise after the event, but perhaps it would have obviated future misunderstandings if the British had expressed their views more frankly.’3 There is no evidence that the British were doing anything other than moving the proposals through the stages of consideration, but later it appeared to the Americans that there had been a breach of faith. The episode had lasting effects on relations between the allies, and contributed to a sense of frustration. In the short term the atmosphere at the upcoming Second Washington Conference was poisoned.

Brooke said at a Defence Committee attended by Hopkins and Marshall on 14 April that the British accepted the American ‘proposals for offensive action in Europe in 1942 perhaps and 1943 for certain’ (my emphases).

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